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KARELIA AS A FINNISH-RUSSIAN ISSUE: RE-NEGOTIATING 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL IDENTITY, 
TERRITORY AND SOVEREIGNTY
INTRODUCTION
As stereotypes would have it Finland is a stable, peaceful Nordic country, located in 
the calm environment of northern Europe. It is developed, well regarded, has stable 
borders and is particularly known for its friendly relations with its neighbours and 
with having developed a positive and mutually benefi cial relationship with Russia 
in particular. 
It has, however, not always been so. Finnish-Russian/Soviet relations have 
historically often been tense, wars have been fought, borders contested and 
sovereignty threatened and defended. At times, as during the Second World War, 
Finland’s very existence has been in question. In particular, disputes have been 
evident over the contested territory of Karelia, a region that transcends the border 
between Finland and Russia. While Russia has historically constructed a close link 
between territory and security and sought control of Karelia1 by pursuing policies 
based on a mixture of imperial and geostrategic reasoning2 – with possession 
of Karelia perceived as providing a greater depth of territorial defence for the 
imperial city of St Petersburg – for Finland Karelia has been less linked to physical 
security and border-related safety. Instead, it has assumed a deeply ontological 
dimension as a mythical territory and soul of the nation. In this respect, being 
depicted as the cradle of the nation, Karelia has at times become seen as central 
to any understanding of Finnishness and occupies a central place in processes 
of national awakening in the nineteenth century. During the inter-war period 
1 Hirsch, Francine (2005), Empire of Nations: Ethnic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press; Kangaspuro, Markku (2000), Neuvosto-Karjalan taistelu itsehallinnosta. 
Nationalismi ja suomalaiset punaiset Neuvostoliiton vallankäytössä 1920–1939 [Soviet-Karelia’s Fight 
for Independence. Nationalism and the Red Finns in the Soviet Use of Power 1920–1939], Helsinki: 
Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden Seura; Liikanen, Ilkka (1999), ‘The Political Construction of Identity: 
Reframing Mental Borders in Russian Karelia’, in Heikki Eskelinen, Ilkka Liikanen, and Jukka Oksa 
(eds.), Curtains of Iron and Gold. Reconstructing Borders and Scales of Interaction, Aldershot: Ashgate, 
pp. 358.
2 Cf. Laine, Antti (2002), ‘Rise and Fall of Soviet Karelia: Continuity and Change in 20th Century Russia’, 
in Antti Laine and Mikko Ylikangas (eds.), Rise and Fall of Soviet Karelia. People and Power, Helsinki: 
Kikimora Publications, p. 11.
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Karelianism reached fever pitch in Finland and calls to annex the territory were met 
with military incursions, which during the Continuation War (1941–1944) resulted 
in a full-scale invasion and programme of assimilation of the region into Finnish 
territory. As a result of the post-War settlement the major part of Karelia3 was ceded 
to Russia, 420,000 Karelian refugees moved to Finland and all the ingredients for 
future confl ict seemed to be in place (see Fig.1). 
Instead, since the end of the Second World War the role of Karelia as a source 
of tension in Finnish-Russian/Soviet relations has over time been meliorated, 
and, more generally, the anxiety generated by the loss of Karelia has been salved 
through the formulation of diff erent self-narratives. Indeed, given the ontological 
signifi cance of Karelia to Finnish national identity the case appears to be a rather 
unlikely and successful instance of confl ict resolution, especially if compared 
to other contested territories impregnated with ontological signifi cance such 
as Abkhazia, the Falklands, Kosovo, the Kurile Islands/Northern Territories, 
Jerusalem or South Ossetia. Here we argue that this development was the result 
of a combined process of renegotiating the nature of Russia/Soviet Union from 
that of an implacable enemy to an international great power and partner, while 
simultaneously renegotiating the position of Karelia in Finnish identity narratives. 
Combined, these provided new grounds upon which the Finnish sense of 
ontological security and national self-esteem could be reinstituted, even during 
a process of giving up claims on a territory widely considered to be a constitutive 
and fundamental part of the national self.
In making the argument we fi rst establish the ontological importance and 
status of Karelia in Finnish national identity discourses in the nineteenth century. 
This then provides the basis for understanding how and why Karelia became a 
point of heightened securitization and confl ict in nationalist narratives following 
Finland’s declaration of independence in 1917 through to the end of the Second 
World War. The paper then turns to the process of confl ict resolution and draws a 
distinction between the Cold War and the post-Cold War period where it is argued 
that signifi cantly diff erent strategies of desecuritization have been evident. Before 
engaging in the analysis, however, a theoretical discussion of ontological security 
and confl ict resolution is required.
3 The area, consisting mainly of the Karelian Isthmus and the Ladoga Karelia, comprises more than 
a tenth of Finland’s total area. As such, ‘Karelia’ tends to have divisive connotations. It refers in 
Russia to the Republic of Karelia whereas it usually stands in the Finnish discussion for the ceded 
areas. Notably, Karelia has never existed as a distinct and unifi ed entity and has often appeared as 
mythical in nature and fi gures as an ‘imagined community’ par excellence (Harle 2000; Harle and 
Moisio 2000; Paasi 1995). As noted by Pirjo Jukarainen (2009), the Karelian borderlands are located 
on both sides of the Finnish-Russian border, and fused with numerous meanings as the boundaries 
have been frequently shifting mainly due to wars. 
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Figure 1. Karelia4
4 Source: Andrew Andersen, available at: http://goo.gl/WkmvsM. Reproduced with the permission of 
the author.
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ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY, DESECURITIZATION AND CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION
As a concept, and at its most fundamental level, ontological security concerns 
the ability of actors to ‘go on’ with their lives without succumbing to paralyzing 
anxieties and insecurities about the nature of existence. Ontologically secure 
actors, it is argued, are those capable of upholding consistent self-biographies 
and understandings of self-identity5. To the extent to which this is possible, 
actors are liable to feel secure about the nature of their environment and their 
role and place within it. A focus on ontological security therefore ties the logic of 
security fundamentally to the production and reproduction of identities, rather 
than the traditional emphasis on the avoidance of, or defence against, threats 
of physical violence. As such, a condition of ontological security need not imply 
that the environment of the ontological secure actor is one of peace or lacking 
tension. What counts is rather the stability of expectations surrounding particular 
relationships. As noted by Mitzen6, while on the one hand security dilemmas may 
indicate the existence of a precarious threat environment where war is understood 
as a constant possibility, at the ontological level security dilemmas can actually 
reinforce the sense of being and identity of the actors involved. A similar point is 
evident in post-structuralist and psychological arguments that the constitution of 
enemies often appears central to how states/groups create a sense of being and 
subjectivity in international relations7. Only by knowing who we are not does it 
become possible to know who we are. 
In this respect, ontological security is the product of stable relationships and 
the expectation that actors will be treated by others in predictable ways – whether 
as friends or enemies. In contrast, the breaking down and transformation of stable 
relationships can in turn become a source of existential anxiety and fear8. This is 
precisely one reason why processes of confl ict resolution can be so diffi  cult, since 
while peace may enhance the overall sense of physical security of the parties to a 
5 Giddens, Anthony (1991), Modernity and Self-Identity, Cambridge: Polity Press.
6 Mitzen, Jennifer (2006), ‘Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security 
Dilemma’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 341–70.
7 Campbell, David (1992), Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press; Mouff e, Chantal (1994), ‘For a politics of nomadic identity’, 
in George Robertson, Melinda Mash, Lisa Tickner, Jon Bird, Barry Curtis and Tim Putnam (eds.), 
Travellers’ Tales: Narratives of Home and Displacement, London: Routledge, pp. 105–13; Mouff e, 
Chantal (2000), The Democratic Paradox, London: Verso; Dijker, Anton, Koomen, Willem, Heuvel, 
Henriette van den, and Frijda, Nico H. (1996), ‘Perceived antecedents of emotional reactions in inter-
ethnic relations’, British Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 313–29.
8 Roe, Paul (2008), ‘The ‘value’ of positive security’, Review of International Studies, vol. 34, p. 782, 778.
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confl ict, it may in turn provide fundamental challenges to the established grounds 
upon which they have constituted their identities (see Rumelili forthcoming). Peace 
processes may therefore generate anxiety over identity, even to the extent that 
they might be rejected in favour of upholding established identities premised on 
confl ict between enemies. As Wæver9 notes, such processes are particularly evident 
and problematic in the context of long established confl icts, where confl icts over 
material issues have transformed into confl icts over mutually reinforcing opposing 
identities.
Confl ict resolution therefore relies upon the desecuritization and reconciliation 
of identities as much as it does on resolving the material issues about which any 
confl ict is ostensibly concerned. Desecuritization hence concerns opening up 
previously securitized identities to new possibilities, shifting away from mutually 
reinforcing depictions of enmity to more benevolent views of the Other. It is thus 
important to consider what desecuritization actually entails and how it might be 
achieved in more detail. 
In this respect, and in contrast to widespread discussion about the concept 
of securitization, debate about desecuritization processes has been relatively 
limited. Indeed, to the extent to which debates have taken place they have 
generally focused on establishing (or contesting) the presumed normative 
benefi ts of desecuritization, as opposed to focusing on the actual mechanics of 
how desecuritization might take place10. Saying this, in his initial discussion of the 
term Wæver11 essentially envisaged desecuritization as a reversal of processes 
of securitization. Thus, if securitization highlights how presenting issues in the 
language of security can foster the development of enemy images and come to 
justify the adoption of exceptionalist measures in tackling them, then on this score 
desecuritization largely amounted to an appeal to avoid the language of security 
through the presentation of issues in other terms.12
9 Wæver, Ole (2008), ‘Fear and Forgetting: How to Leave Longstanding Confl icts through De-
securitization’, paper presented for the fi rst Research Seminar of CAST, Copenhagen University, 
29/10/2008.
10 E.g. see Aradau, Claudia (2004), ‘Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and 
Emancipation’, Journal of International of International Relations and Development, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 
388–413; Behnke, Andreas (2006), ‘No Way Out – Desecuritization, Emancipation and the Eternal 
Return of the Political – A Replay to Aradau’, Journal of International Relations and Development, vol. 
9, no. 1, pp. 62–69.
11 Wæver, Ole (1995), ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security, 
New York: Columbia University Press.
12 Also see Deudney, Daniel (1990), ‘The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and 
National Security’, Millennium, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 461–73.
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Arguably, however, this emphasis on rearticulating threats in non-securitized 
terms, by trying to convince people that the Other (or the issue at hand) is not 
as irrational or dangerous as perceived, only captures one possible mechanism 
towards promoting the desecuritization of confl icts13. As noted above, it is also a 
process which, while tackling the fear of the Other, may also induce considerable 
anxiety by undermining established conceptions of identity. However, de-
securitization may also take diff erent forms, potentially with diff erent eff ects. In 
this respect, Hansen14 has identifi ed three other strategies of desecuritization 
alongside that of rearticulation. These alternatives can be labelled strategies of 
replacement, silencing and fading. ‘Replacement’ refers to a process whereby one 
perceived threat is downplayed by emphasizing another threat of mutual concern. 
At one level this could entail a process of simply swapping enemies, and as such 
might be seen as resolving one confl ict via a process of generating another. 
However, cases of emphasizing common soft security concerns (health, pollution, 
development, organized crime) as a means to foster common approaches and 
ameliorate previously highly securitized relations can also be identifi ed – not least 
in the Baltic Sea Region.15 
In contrast, a strategy of ‘silencing’ achieves desecuritization through actively 
repressing discussion of the issue at hand. This may take the form of providing 
incentives (e.g. threats of punishment, ostracism, humiliation) to avoid any mention 
of the security problem.16 Finally, ‘fading’ indicates a situation in which a normalized 
politics is presumed as evident from the start and where questions of security are 
largely absent from discussion because they are no longer deemed relevant. 
In Hansen’s17 terms, fading is a situation where former threats ‘no longer 
exercise our minds and imaginations’ and are ultimately forgotten. Importantly, 
this is not about burying one’s head in the sand and suppressing talk about extant 
securitizations in the hope they might just disappear18. Instead, fading entails 
embracing a diff erent ontological perspective from that which has generated and 
13 Huysmans, Jef (1995), ’Migrants as a security problem: dangers of ’securititizing societal issues’, 
in Miles, Robert and Tränhardt, Dietrich (eds.), Migration and European Integration London: Pinter 
Publishers, p. 65.
14 Hansen, Lene (2010), ’Re-reading Desecuritization: Uncovering the Normative-Political in the 
Copenhagen School’, Paper presented at the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations 
Conference, Stockholm, September 9–11, 2010; Hansen, Lene (2012), ‘Reconstructing de-
securitisation: the normative-political in the Copenhagen School and direction for how to apply it’, 
Review of International Studies, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 525–46.
15 Browning, Christopher, S. and Joenniemi, Pertti (2004), ‘Regionality Beyond Security? The Baltic Sea 
After Enlargement’, Cooperation and Confl ict, vol. 39, no. 3, p. 239.
16 For a critical analysis of such a ‘silencing’ process see Hansen (2000).
17 Hansen, Lene (2010), op. cit.
18 Huysmans, Jef (1995), op. cit., p. 65.
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supported a confl ict in the fi rst place, and might, for instance, entail abandoning 
a diff erential logic of identity construction or, as in the case of Karelia in Finnish 
identity discourses, entail renegotiating the relationship between national identity, 
territory and sovereignty. 
Before turning to the case analysis it is, however, important to make one further 
point about ontological security. As indicated by the above discussion, ontological 
security is fundamentally linked to the preservation of stable relationships with 
signifi cant Others – whether those relationships be friendly or antagonistic – and 
this dynamic is obviously central to any understanding of the nature of confl ict 
and prospects for confl ict resolution also in the case of territorial disputes. Yet, 
the ontology of ontological security has dimensions that also go beyond this. 
For example, ontological security is also likely to be tied to socially constructed 
understandings of the nature of subjectivity in specifi c contexts. Indeed, the nature 
of any specifi c Self-Other relationship may itself be a function of perceived threats 
to these other foundations of ontological security. In terms of understanding the 
emergence (and subsequent resolution) of the confl ict over Karelia, for example, it 
is important to understand how contemporary ideas about nationalism impacted 
upon Finnish understandings of the requirements and needs of national identity – 
in particular, the extent to which the emergence and success of the nineteenth 
century project of national awakening became tied to Herderian and Hegelian 
understandings that, to be complete, nations needed to possess a distinctive 
culture, territory and ultimately sovereignty over that territory. It is these ideas – 
and their translation into a Finnish context – that ultimately provided the grounds 
upon which Karelia was to be ascribed with mythical and privileged status in the 
mental geographies of Finnish nationalism.
NATIONAL AWAKENING AND THE MYTHOLOGIZATION OF KARELIA
As a politico-national entity Finland is a relatively recent construction. Prior to 
1809 most of present day Finland was part of Sweden and lacked any heritage of 
administrative unity, or its people any discernible sense of history and national 
identity as Finns19. Indeed, most of the elite spoke Swedish with the people’s 
loyalties largely directed to the Swedish Crown20. Following the 1808–1809 
19 Klinge, Matti (1993), ‘Finland: From Napoleonic legacy to Nordic Cooperation’, in Mikulás Teich 
and Ray Porter (eds.), The National Question in Europe in Historical Context, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 321.
20 Huxley, Steven D. (1990), Constitutionalist Insurgency in Finland, Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen 
Seura; Studia Historica 38, p. 85.
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Swedish-Russian war, Finland was ceded to Russia, which in an attempt to win over 
the loyalties of their new subjects granted Finland an autonomous administrative 
status as a Grand Duchy of the Russian empire21. Thus, while in 1809 the sense 
of Finnishness may have been limited the creation of the Grand Duchy certainly 
provided the grounds upon which a distinct political national consciousness might 
be built22. Indeed, before long Swedish-speaking elites were actively seeking to do 
precisely that and it was in this process that the ideas of Herder and Hegel were 
important in providing an understanding of what it was to be a nation and therefore 
framing what became understood as the essence of Finland and Finnishness in the 
nineteenth century and beyond.
Herder’s emphasis on culture as the foundation of national distinctiveness 
was particularly infl uential in Finland, in part because of the country’s lack of a 
distinct political or monarchical history to draw upon. For Herder nations were 
natural and organic products of the distinct physical environments they inhabit. 
These environments, he contended, account for diff erences in national character 
and culture, with national cultural distinctiveness primarily expressed through 
the original language of the people, as evident in the nation’s presumed unique 
folk poetry and oral tradition. Indeed, for Herder folk poems were ‘the archives of 
a nationality’, ‘the imprints of the soul’, ‘the living voice of the nationalities’23. As 
received in Finland the implications of Herder’s analysis was that to awaken the 
nation the nationalists needed to provide evidence of the nation’s distinctiveness, 
to recreate the national memory, by rediscovering the national soul in its folk 
poetry and oral tradition.24 
In contrast, while Herder was primarily concerned with the survival of national 
cultures25, Hegel’s infl uence stemmed from his understanding that all things that 
entered history were endowed with a particular historical mission. For nations, Hegel 
argued, this mission would be fulfi lled through the achievement of statehood26. 
21 Lundin, C. Leonard (1981), ‘Finland’, in Edward C. Thaden (ed.), Russifi cation in the Baltic Provinces and 
Finland, 1855–1914, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 362. 
22 Kemiläinen, Aira (1989), ‘Nationalism in Nineteenth Century Finland’, in Antero Tammisto, Katarina 
Mustakallio and Hannes Saarinen (eds.), Miscellanea, Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura; Studia 
Historica 33, p. 111.
23 Quoted in Wilson, William A. (1976), Folklore and Nationalism in Modern Finland, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, p. 29, 30; Branch, Michael (1998), ‘Kalevala’, http://www.vn.fi /vn/um/fi nfo/
english/kaleveng.html (accessed 08/04/98).
24 Wilson, William A. (1976), op. cit., pp. 28–30;
25 See Joenniemi, Pertti (2002), ‘Finland in the New Europe: A Herderian or Hegelian Project?’ in Lene 
Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.), European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic 
States, London: Routledge, p. 192.
26 Gellner, Ernest (1997), Nationalism, London: Phoenix, p. 65; Rocker, Rudolf (1998), Nationalism and 
Culture, Montreal: Black Rose Books, p. 195. 
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The importance of Herder and Hegel, therefore, was that they provided a blueprint 
of the ontological foundations of national subjectivity, a checklist against which 
the national project could be measured and national self-esteem built. According 
to this checklist the nation needed a distinct language, a distinct folklore tradition, 
a distinct national territory, and ultimately, sovereignty over that territory.
The initial result of such infl uences was that the fi rst goal of Finnish nationalists 
became that of promoting the use and development of Finnish literature and the 
Finnish language throughout society. A key mechanism for this was the creation of 
the Finnish Literature Society in 1831.27 However, it also entailed large numbers of 
the Swedish-speaking elite fennicising their names and adopting Finnish as their 
primary language. Given that a distinctive literature and history was largely absent 
the leaders of the nationalist movement devoted particular attention to fi lling this 
gap. Drawing on Herder they identifi ed the language and folk traditions of ‘ordinary 
people’ as their primary source material and set about collecting as many tales 
and poems as possible. Also following Herder they believed the most authentic 
language, tales and poems would be found in the wilder and more remote areas of 
Finnish-speaking habitation – the view being these were less likely to have suff ered 
from foreign infl uences. Here the national soul would be purest. This led the national 
romanticists – motivated by the assertion that they were neither Swedes nor 
Russians28 – to the Finnish-speakers of the north and east of the Grand Duchy and 
the Karelians of Archangel Province and across the border in Russia29, as the people 
whom it was believed could furnish them with the required dose of originality and 
authenticity. 
Central to this movement was Elias Lönnrot, who in 1835 published a collection 
of folk poems, the Kalevala, which was to have a profound impact on the 
development and nature of Finnish nationalism. The Kalevala depicted a golden 
age of ancient Finnish peoples who, free of the yoke of foreign domination, lived 
epic lives of adventure and magic. Depicting an ancient history of the Finns from the 
creation of the world to the coming of Christ the Kalevala was invoked to support 
the claim that the Finns were an ancient, cultured, civilised people with a pure and 
grandiose past. In short, the Finns now had a national epic to compare with that 
of the Greeks, but an epic that was also viewed as a valid historical document in its 
27 Vuorela, Toivo (1977), Ethnology in Finland Before 1920, Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, p. 22; 
Klinge, Matti (1990), Let Us Be Finns: Essays on History, Helsinki: Otava Publishing Company, p. 77.
28 Harle, Vilho and Moisio, Sami (2000), Missä on Suomi? Kansallisen identiteettipolitiikan historia ja 
geopolitiikka [Where is Finland? The History and Geopolitics of National Identity Politics], Tampere: 
Vastapaino, p. 74.
29 Branch, Michael (1998), op. cit.
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own right30. In this respect the Kalevala provided the Finns with an historical self-
awareness31 and a national project to recover the history and culture of the nation, 
and ultimately to reclaim national independence. As Wilson32 puts it, ‘The Kalevala 
thus became their book of independence, their passport into the family of civilised 
nations’.
In respect of Karelia, the key point is not only that Lönnrot collected his source 
material for the Kalevala from the region, but also that he conjectured that the 
Finnish ancestors of whom the Kalevala told had lived in the area of present day 
Karelia.33 Ultimately this had the eff ect of turning Karelia into an almost holy territory 
and the promised land of Finnish nationalism, with the land of Karelia becoming the 
fount from which Finnish culture and nationhood derived. This assumed Herderian 
connection between nature, land and the nation turned Karelia and the Kalevala 
into a primary inspiration for artists, composers and historians, whose works in turn 
served to enhance the sense of national emotional attachment to the territory. As 
Engman34 notes:
Finnish artists and scholars were looking for an original Finnish paradise and 
found their last traces of it in Eastern Karelia. The national-romantic currents of 
ideas that may have been given their most pregnant expressions in connection 
with Karelia played an important part in building the nation in Finland, and also 
in making Karelia a kind of Promised Land to Finns.
This connection to Karelia became important, not least because prior to the 
nineteenth century a clearly demarcated and accepted understanding of the 
nature of Finland and its borders was largely lacking. The creation of the Grand 
Duchy in 1809 existed as one concrete manifestation of Finnish territory, but one 
that, as the nineteenth century progressed, nationalists increasingly viewed as 
artifi cial. Indeed, as the century progressed a Hegelian emphasis on the need to 
amalgamate national and state borders gained ground, which when combined 
with the Herderian emphasis on organic cultures increasingly led nationalists 
to make territorial claims on Karelia.35 Given its position as the mythologised 
30 Branch, Michael (1998), op. cit.; Wilson, William A. (1976), op. cit., pp. 70–82.
31 Singleton, Fred (1989), A Short History of Finland, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 75.
32 Wilson, William A. (1976), op. cit., p. x.
33 Rubulis, Aleksis (1970), Baltic Literature, London: The University of Notre Dame Press, p. 8.
34 Engman, Max (1995), ‘Karelians between East and West’, in Sven Tägil (ed.), Ethnicity and Nation 
Building in the Nordic World, London: Hurst and Company, p. 221.
35 Indeed, some nationalists had even broader ambitions, claiming vast tracts of northern and central 
Russia as being Finnish land on the grounds that their inhabitants spoke languages related to 
Finnish. This also indicates how racialist ideas that confl ated race with language and nationality 
were also infl uential at the time (Wilson 1976: 138–9).
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heartland of the nation, the separation of most of Karelia from the Grand Duchy 
increasingly began to take on existential dimensions – a sign that Finland was 
not yet whole, but deformed. Calls to (re)incorporate Karelia into Finnish territory 
grew, and from the 1880s provided the inspiration for teachers to start crossing the 
border into Karelia to teach the Karelians Finnish and Finnish ideas.36 The Russians 
resented such moves, not least because they considered the Orthodox Karelians 
as ‘potential Russians’. Attempts to promote Lutheranism and fennicisation were 
therefore countered by the Russian authorities reasserting Russian claims to the 
region, not least through establishing Russian schools.37 
Indeed, by the 1890s the loyalty of the Finns to the empire was being increasingly 
questioned, with this resulting in a more general process of russifi cation designed 
to bring the Finns to heel. Amongs other things the freedoms of the Grand Duchy 
were restricted, while the Russian language was introduced into the Finnish Senate, 
educational institutions and administrative offi  ces.38 Russifi cation, however, only 
fostered unrest, one element of which was a renewed wave of cultural production 
drawing predominantly on themes from the Kalevala and Karelia.39 By the end 
of the nineteenth century, therefore, it is clear that Karelia, as an integral part of 
territorially based nationalism, had come to occupy a special status in Finnish 
national discourse. Not only was Karelia viewed as a site of national authenticity 
and the resting place of the Finnish soul (the Kalevala), but it was also the land from 
which the Finns and Finnish culture sprang. By the end of the century Karelia was 
therefore not simply of cultural or even territorial importance, but of fundamental 
ontological salience.
FIGHTING FOR KARELIA
In 1917, and in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution, Finnish independence was 
declared, shortly followed by the outbreak of civil war between worker groups (the 
Reds) and the bourgeois elite (the Whites). For the Reds the civil war was a ‘class war’ 
36 Wilson, William A. (1976), op. cit., p. 141.
37 Engman, Max (1995), op. cit., pp. 222–3. 
38 Thaden, Edward C. (1981), ‘The Russian Government’, in Edward C. Thaden (ed.), Russifi cation in the 
Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855–1914, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 82.
39  It is important to note that for most of the nineteenth century, most Finns remained loyal to the 
Tsar and saw Finland’s future as best assured within the confi nes of the empire. It was only towards 
the end of the century and in the run-up to the Bolshevik Revolution that sentiment turned against 
Russia and in favour of independence more broadly (see Browning 2008: 96–112).
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with the aim of pushing the new country in a more socialist direction40. In contrast the 
Whites (the victors) viewed the Reds as Bolshevik inspired agitators whose triumph 
would result in Finland’s absorption into Bolshevik Russia. For them, the civil war 
was therefore understood as a ‘war of independence’.41 Across the right of Finnish 
society anti-Russian feeling fl ourished, with Russia quickly becoming designated as 
the nation’s hereditary enemy.42 Seen as siding with the Bolsheviks the Reds were 
also depicted as national traitors and therefore liable to extreme punishment.43 In 
this respect, the emergence of anti-Russian sentiment in Finland in the inter-war 
period – which during the period of the Grand Duchy had been limited to a social 
fringe – was intimately connected to the country’s internal political struggles. From 
the perspective of the Whites, however, Bolshevik Russia represented an existential 
threat to the social order, with the Reds’ uprising ultimately explained away as a 
result of the workers becoming infected with a cancerous Russian disease.44
The eff ect of this was that in Rightist thinking anti-Russianism became a central 
narrative on which to build national unity. As expressed in 1923 by Elias Simojoki 
(a theology student and later Lutheran priest and right wing politician) ‘Hate of the 
Ruski was that power which made Finland free. Hate of the Ruski… is the Finnish 
spirit’.45 Thus, while Bolshevik Russia was perceived as a constant threat to the 
sovereignty and independence of (bourgeois) Finland, it also existed as a defi ning 
radicalised Other upon which an identity and mission for independent Finland could 
be built. Throughout the course of the 1920s and 1930s this mission was framed in 
terms of Finland as an outpost guarding the borders of Western civilization from 
Eastern barbarism.46 Organisations like the Academic Karelia Society – particularly 
40 Karvonen, Lauri (1988), From White to Blue-and-Black: Finnish Fascism, in the Inter-War Era, Helsinki: 
Commentationes Scientiarum Socialium, 36, p. 14; Maude, George (1976), The Finnish Dilemma, 
London: Oxford University Press, p. 6. 
41 Jutikkala, Eino and Pirinen, Kauko (1996), A History of Finland, Helsinki: WSOY, p. 397; Alapuro, 
Risto (1994), ‘Nineteenth-Century Nationalism in Finland’, in Øystein Sørensen (ed.) Nordic Paths to 
National Identity in the Nineteenth Century, Oslo: The Research Council of Norway, pp. 89–90. 
42 See Karemaa, Outi (1998), Vihollisia, vainoojia, syöpäläisiä: Venäläisviha Suomessa 1917–1923 [Foes, 
Fiends and Vermin. Ethnic Hatred of Russians in Finland 1917–1923], Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen 
Seura, Bibliotheca Historica 30.
43 Arosalo, Sirkka (1998), ‘Social Conditions for Political Violence: Red and White Terror in the Finnish 
Civil War of 1918’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 35, no. 2, p. 155; Upton, Anthony F. (1980), The 
Finnish Revolution 1917–1918, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 313.
44 Luostarinen, Heikki (1989), ‘Finnish Russophobia: The Story of an Enemy Image’, Journal of Peace 
Research, vol. 26, no. 2, p. 129; Hannula, J. O. (1939), Finland’s War of Independence, London: Faber 
and Faber Limited, pp. 33–34; Wuorinen, John H. (1931), Nationalism in Modern Finland, New York: 
Columbia University Press, p. 222. 
45 Quoted in Wilson, William A. (1976), op. cit., pp. 132–3. 
46 Browning, Christopher S. (2008), Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis: A Case Study of 
Finland, Oxford: Peter Lang, pp. 131–6; Paasi, Anssi (1996), Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: 
The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, p. 171. 
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infl uential amongst students – actively fostered anti-Russian sentiment and told 
their members to prepare for the inevitable future fi ght.47 In this sense, the threat 
of Bolshevik Russia was off ered up on the right of Finnish society as a considerable 
source of identity and ontological security for the new nation-state.
Despite having gained independence, the prospects for confl ict with the Soviet 
Union were enhanced by continued dissatisfaction about the perceived lack of 
congruence between Finland’s national and territorial borders. Across the political 
right the national mission was not confi ned to protecting the borders of Western 
civilisation, but was extended to the need to build a Greater Finland through 
liberating the cultural kinfolk beyond the national borders.48 While the most 
ambitious envisaged annexing Estonia, Western Bothnia (in Sweden), Finnmark 
(in Norway) and large swathes of Russian territory, Karelia remained the primary 
goal.49 Finland’s claim to Karelia was asserted in various ways. Folklorists found 
justifi cation in the Kalevala’s Karelian heritage50, while geographers proclaimed 
the 1918 borders ‘artifi cial’ and identifi ed the nation’s expanded ‘natural’ borders as 
encompassing Karelian territory.51 Linguists and ethnicists made similar arguments. 
Such securitized arguments proved motivating. In 1918, for example, with tacit 
support of the government Finnish volunteers launched a military incursion across 
the border, with plans drawn up for a full invasion in fulfi lment of annexing Karelia.52 
When a new government brought the mission to a halt and later signed the Treaty 
of Tartu (1920) with the Soviet Union, thereby confi rming the 1917 borders, the 
action was considered both dishonourable and treasonous on the right. The 
strength of feeling was demonstrated by Bobi Sivén, an offi  cial from Repola – a 
parish due to be handed back to the Soviet Union – who on lowering the national 
fl ag for the last time shot himself, becoming a martyr to the nationalist cause 
and whose death the Academic Karelia Society subsequently commemorated in 
following years by marching to his grave on the anniversary of the signing of the 
47 Browning, Christopher S. (2008), op. cit., p. 137. 
48 Rintala, Marvin (1962), Three Generations: The Extreme Right Wing in Finnish Politics, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, p. 74. 
49 Paasi, Anssi (1996), Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the 
Finnish-Russian Border, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, p. 101. 
50 Wilson, William A. (1976), op. cit., pp. 94–102. 
51 Paasi, Anssi (1996), op. cit., pp. 182–3. 
52 Kangaspuro, Markku (2000), Neuvosto-Karjalan taistelu itsehallinnosta. Nationalismi ja suomalaiset 
punaiset Neuvostoliiton vallankäytössä 1920–1939 [Soviet-Karelia’s Fight for Independence. 
Nationalism and the Red Finns in the Soviet Use of Power 1920–1939], Helsinki: Suomalaisen 
kirjallisuuden Seura; Rintala, Marvin (1974), ‘Finland’, in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (eds.), The 
European Right: A Historical Profi le, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, p. 421.
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Treaty of Tartu. They also sewed the fatal bullet into the Society’s fl ag.53 Indeed, 
come 1921 volunteers launched another unsuccessful attack into Karelia, and this 
time murdered the Minister of the Interior in response to government eff orts to 
stop the action.54
The most signifi cant action, however, took place during the Second World 
War, in what in Finland is known as the Continuation War (1941–1944). During 
this confl ict Finland aligned with German forces to launch an off ensive deep into 
Soviet territory. For nationalists the prospects of fulfi lling the national mission by 
incorporating Karelia and making Finland whole was enthusiastically embraced. 
Indeed, privately President Ryti declared the creation of Greater Finland to be an 
explicit war aim.55 Such aims were made public by Carl Gustav Mannerheim, the 
Commander of the Finnish Forces, in an Order of the Day delivered to soldiers on 
10 July 1941.
In the War of Liberation in 1918, I swore to the Finnish and Viena Karelians 
that I would not sheath my sword until Finland and East Karelia were free… 
For twenty-three years [the provinces] of Viena and Aunus have awaited the 
fulfi lment of this promise… Fighters in the War of Liberation, famous men of the 
Winter War [1939–1940], my gallant soldiers! A new day has dawned… Karelian 
freedom and a great Finland glimmer before us in the powerful avalanche of 
world historical events…Soldiers! The soil on which you tread is holy land, full of 
the blood and suff ering of our tribe. Your victories will free Karelia; your deeds 
will create for Finland a great, happy future.56
Mannerheim clearly believed in the motivational force of Karelia. Once again 
attempts were made to justify the annexation of Karelia by emphasising its 
distinctly Finnish attributes via the publication of maps and books on Greater 
Finland and the teaching of the Kalevala.57 In 1941, for example, a special edition of 
the journal Terra, sought to prove through analyses of bedrock, fl ora and fauna and 
economic connections that the ‘forthcoming’ Finland was justifi ed, while the Ministry 
of Education established a Scientifi c Committee for Eastern Karelia, and published a 
book, Finnlands Lebensraum, establishing Finland’s need for expansion.58 Not least, 
53 Rintala, Marvin (1962), Three Generations: The Extreme Right Wing in Finnish Politics, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, pp. 99–102.
54 Selén, Kari (1985), ‘The Main Lines of Finnish Security Policy Between the World Wars’, in Commission 
Finlandaise d’Histoire Militaire (ed.), Aspects of Security: The Case of Independent Finland, Vaasa, pp. 
17–18.
55 Puntila, L. A. (1974), The Political History of Finland 1809–1966, Helsinki: Otava Publishing Co, p. 176. 
56 Quoted in Wilson, William A. (1976), op. cit., p. 184. 
57 Engman, Max (1995), ‘Karelians between East and West’, in Sven Tägil (ed.), Ethnicity and Nation 
Building in the Nordic World, London: Hurst and Company, pp. 217–46, p. 232.
58 Paasi, Anssi (1996), op. cit., pp. 185–6. 
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in the annexed areas a programme was established and designed to re-educate 
the local Karelians as Finns and to naturalise Finland’s new geographical borders.
REARTICULATION AND SILENCING DURING THE COLD WAR
In the end, however, Finland lost the war. The post-war settlement proved costly. 
Finland was saddled with paying a large war indemnity to the Soviet Union, the 
positioning of a Soviet military base at Porkkala on a peninsula west of Helsinki, 
was required to withdraw to the 1940 borders and on top of that was forced to cede 
Petsamo, its Arctic gateway to the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, 420,000 refugees  – 
almost all of them Karelian by background – needed to be resettled in Finland, 
with this highly symbolic of the failure of wartime dreams of annexation. Indeed, 
the Soviet Union set about a systematic policy of sovietisation in the region, by 
replacing the population with thousands of migrants from Russia, Belarus, Ukraine 
and beyond.59
Combined, the lost war, the post-war settlement (in particular the enforced 
encounter with an extensive group of Karelians), and the loss of Karelia proved 
a traumatic experience for the nation. The loss of territory and homes in Karelia 
was felt by many as a grave injustice, while in the immediate post-war years there 
was a deep sense of vulnerability, anxiety and dread that the fate of Karelia might 
yet await the rest of Finland. Throughout the Cold War, however, Finland retained 
its independence and even developed what was widely perceived at the time as 
a mutually benefi cial relationship with the Soviet Union. To understand how this 
was possible requires understanding both how previous enemy images of the 
Soviet Union/Russia were transcended and how the privileged and mythologized 
position of Karelia in Finnish nationalist narratives was reconfi gured. Arguably this 
took place through a desecuritization process that combined strategies of both 
rearticulation and silencing.
The most signifi cant move was made by Finland’s post-war president, Juho 
Paasikivi (1946–1956), who called for a complete reappraisal of the foundations 
of post-war Finnish foreign policy, which was to be premised upon a fundamental 
rearticulation of established inter-war understandings of the Soviet Union. Instead 
of being driven by an inherently expansionist ideological impulse, Paasikivi argued 
the Soviet Union was much like other great powers, with largely limited and strategic 
interests. So long as Finland was sensitive to those interests the Soviet Union would 
59 Jakobson-Obolenski, Sergei (1999), Karelia within European, Russian, Northern Dimension: 
Problematizing Spatio-Territorial and Political Relations in Northern Europe’, Gateway Papers no. 3. 
International School of Social Sciences. University of Tampere, pp. 19–20. 
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respond favourably.60 Paasikivi argued that the Finns’ failure to understand this 
during the inter-war period was a direct result of their misperception of Soviet/
Russian identity. For Paasikivi, inter-war Finns had been blinded by an unjustifi ed 
hatred of the Russians, with the depiction of the eastern neighbour as the ‘hereditary 
enemy’ resulting in reckless foreign policy choices.61 From this perspective Finnish 
national identity needed to become less ‘chauvinistic’, ‘intolerant’ and ‘emotional’62 
and more pragmatic, rational and realistic. Indeed, from this perspective, as a small 
state in a realpolitik world, Finland’s very survival depended on it.63
In itself, however, this eff ort to ‘rearticulate’ the nature of the Soviet Union and 
the potential threat it might pose to Finland was not considered suffi  cient. Indeed, 
premised as it was on rejecting established worldviews and systems of meaning, the 
rearticulation strategy was a source of anxiety for many, and for whom fears of Soviet 
annexation remained high, although as time passed these did weaken. It is notable, 
therefore, that the rearticulation strategy was accompanied by moves designed 
to further promote the Soviet Union’s desecuritization and the reconfi guration of 
Finnish national identity through ‘silencing’ practices. These practices took various 
forms. For instance, rightist organisations (now labelled ‘fascist’) like the Academic 
Karelia Society and the Civil Guards were prohibited, inter-war politicians were 
encouraged to step aside, with several wartime leaders imprisoned. Particularly 
notable, however, was a systematic process of eradicating negative images of the 
Soviet Union from the public domain. This included libraries destroying hundreds 
of books, disparaging references to the Soviet Union being erased from school 
textbooks, ‘unsuitable’ gramophone records being removed from the archives of 
the national broadcaster, and the removal of ‘anti-Soviet’ monuments.64 Indeed, in 
1948 a law was passed that provided for a two-year prison sentence for journalists 
60 Paasikivi, Juho Kusti (1956), Paasikiven Linja I: Juho Kusti Paasikiven Puheita Vuosilta 1944–1956 [The 
Paasikivi Line, vol.1. Speeches 1944–1956], Porvoo: WSOY, pp. 35–6; Hanhimäki, Jussi M. (1997), 
Containing Coexistence: America, Russia, and the “Finnish Solution”, Kent, Ohio: Kent State University 
Press, p. 11. 
61 Pajunen, Aimo (1969), ‘Finland’s Security Policy’, in Ilkka Heiskanen, Jukka Huopaniemi, Keijo 
Korhonen and Klaus Törnudd (eds.), Essays on Finnish Foreign Policy, Vammala: Finnish Political 
Science Association, p. 8; Paasikivi, Juho Kusti (1956), Paasikiven Linja I: Juho Kusti Paasikiven Puheita 
Vuosilta 1944–1956 [The Paasikivi Line, vol.1. Speeches 1944–1956], Porvoo: WSOY, p. 14. 
62 Kekkonen, Urho (1970), Neutrality: The Finnish Position, London: Heinemann, p. 110. 
63 For a detailed account of the post-war reappraisal see Browning (2008: 172–8).
64 Salokangas, Raimo (1996), ‘The Finnish Broadcasting Company and the Changing Finnish Society, 
1949–1966’, in Rauno Endén (ed.), Yleisradio 1926–1996: A History of Broadcasting in Finland, Helsinki: 
WSOY Painolaistokset, p. 117; Hadjú, Zoltán and Paasi, Anssi (1995) ‘The Changing Representations 
of Finland in Geographical Texts in Hungary: a Contextual Analysis’, Fennia, vol. 173, no. 1, p. 43; Uola, 
Mikko (1999), ‘The Dissolution of Organisations During the Finnish ‘Years of Danger’’, in Mikko Uuola, 
Suomi sitoutuu hajottamaan…: Järjestöjen lakkauttaminen vuoden 1944 välirauhansopimuksen 21. 
artiklan perusteella, Helsinki: Suomem Historiallinen Seura, Historiallisia Tutkimuksia 201, p. 282.
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convicted of writing articles deemed defamatory to ‘foreign powers’ (a euphemism 
for the Soviet Union), and which was only rescinded in 1995.65
As the Cold War progressed such silencing practices became increasingly 
self-fulfi lling (and socially pernicious) as social organisations – and citizens more 
generally – increasingly responded to government demands for self-censorship in 
respect of the eastern neighbour – a tendency that became one element of the 
pejorative label of Finlandization during the Cold War. To this extent, while silencing 
practices may have helped reinforce the strategy of rearticulation by curtailing the 
space available for alternative narratives openly questioning Paasikivi’s reappraisal 
of the Soviet Union’s identity and interests, it also had the potential to generate 
signifi cant anxieties for those citizens who challenged the offi  cial line, and who 
faced social opprobrium – and, as noted, even threats of imprisonment. Meanwhile, 
despite its intention, the silencing strategy also seems to have masked rather than 
resolved extant fears, since silencing was premised on fears that imprudence could 
ultimately provoke Soviet aggression – a view that returned after the end of the 
Cold War.
Unsurprisingly, silencing practices were also extended to discussion of Karelia, 
and in this respect nationalist sentiments towards the territory, were sacrifi ced for 
the overall goal of preserving independence and sovereignty. Various eff orts to raise 
the issue and place it on the Finnish foreign policy agenda and that of Finnish-Soviet 
relations failed.66 Indeed, the Soviets actively threatened negative consequences 
should the Finns decide to raise the issue at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference.67 For 
his part, Paasikivi told a delegation of Karelian members of parliament to dampen 
their aspirations, warning them: ‘It is not the small nations which decide things 
now, but the large ones which draw the borders they want on the map; the victors 
decide’.68 However, while public discussion of the Karelia question was dissuaded, 
from 1968–1972 President Kekkonen did raise the issue secretly with Soviet leaders 
on several occasions. Indeed, according Max Jakobson69, Kekkonen was actually 
obsessed with the issue and thought that regaining Karelia would signifi cantly 
65 Salminen, Esko (1999), The Silenced Media: The Propaganda War between Russia and the West in 
Northern Europe, Macmillan Press Ltd, p. 16.
66 Fingerroos, Outi (2012) Karjalan kysymyksen kolme aaltoa [The three waves of the Karelian 
question], in Fingerroos, Outi and Häyrynen, Maunu (eds.) Takaisin Karjalaan (Helsinki: Suomalaisen 
Kirjallisuuden Seura), pp. 31–1.
67 Polvinen, Tuomo (1986), Between East and West: Finland in International Politics, 1944–1947, Porvoo: 
WSOY, pp. 230–1, 236; Heikkilä, Hannu (1989), ‘Finland’s Road from War to Peace, 1944–1947’, in 
Tenho Takalo (ed.) Finns and Hungarians Between East and West, Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen 
Seura; Studia Historica 32, pp. 173.
68 Quoted in Polvinen, Tuomo (1986), op. cit., p. 159.
69 Jakobson, Max (2003), Tilinpäätös. Osa III [Closing the Books. Part III], Helsinki: Otava, pp. 219–220. 
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enhance public support for the restrictive policies being pursued domestically. 
In particular, Kekkonen proposed an exchange of territory, whereby in return 
for receiving Karelia, Finland would grant the Soviet Union signifi cant territorial 
concessions in Lapland.70 The proposal is instructive on several counts. First, it 
indicates the extent to which territorial sovereignty over Karelia continued to 
evoke emotional resonance amongst Finnish leaders and how its loss was viewed 
as ontologically damaging to Finland’s sense of selfhood. Second, it is indicative 
of the extent to which Karelia remained a mythologized and privileged part of the 
homeland, at least when compared to Lapland.
Also interesting is that alongside the more general silencing of debate about 
Karelia there also took place a signifi cant rearticulation and reapparaisal of the status 
of the Kalevala amongst Finnish folklorists. Previous scholars (e.g. Kaarle Krohn, 
Martti Haavio, Jalmari Jaakola) were now attacked ‘for their ultra-nationalism, their 
imperialistic dreams of a Greater Finland, and their unrelenting hate of the Soviet 
Union’, and their use of the Kalevala and the broader folklore tradition to this end.71 
Instead of being a tale of a real historical past refl ecting the ancient Finnish life and 
spirit, the Kalevala was now seen as simply a largely fabricated product of Lönnrot’s 
imaginative genius.72 Reducing it to simply a work of art, in this way served to strip 
it of much of its political and security-related signifi cance, further supporting the 
reconstitution of national identity along more ‘pragmatic’ and ‘realist’ grounds, 
while simultaneously to some extent demystifying the Karelia myth.
REPLACEMENT AND FADING IN POST-COLD WAR FINLAND
The end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union resulted in a 
considerable amount of soul-searching and critical refl ection on the nature 
of Finnish-Soviet relations in Finland, one result of which was that previous 
desecuritizing strategies of rearticulation and silencing were challenged and to 
diff ering degrees delegitimized. The suppression of public debate and criticism, 
and the widespread adherence to demands for self-censorship occasioned by the 
Finlandization phenomenon was no longer seen as the prudent course of action 
70 Suomi, Juhani (1994), Presidentti. Urho Kekkonen 1962–68 [The President. Urho Kekkonen 1962–68], 
Helsinki: Otava, pp. 480–4; Finland was able to regain the Porkkala base in 1956 and reached an 
agreement in 1963 with the Soviet Union on renting the Saima canal connecting Lake Saimaa (via 
Viborg) with the Gulf of Finland. The discussions on these two issues have, however, remained 
largely detached from that over Karelia, indicating that Karelia remains ontologically in a separate 
category.
71  Wilson, William A. (1976), op. cit., p. 199. 
72 Ibid., pp. 196–7. 
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for a small state with a great power neighbour, but was now viewed by many as 
having had a much more pernicious eff ect on the quality of Finnish democracy.73 
This critique of attempts to desecuritize Finnish-Russian relations and debate 
about Karelia through silencing practices was, in the 1990s, in turn accompanied 
by a revisionist understanding of the nature of the Soviet threat. Contra Paasikivi’s 
depiction of the Soviet Union as a pragmatic great power with limited territorial 
aspirations, Soviet/Russian interests in Finland were now depicted as having been 
inherently expansionist.74
Although such processes of critical refl ection resulted in a renewed tendency 
to depict the eastern neighbour as Finland’s historical threatening other, arguably 
the principal securitizing move here was one about Finland’s own past behaviour 
whereby the fundamental threat of the Cold War was not so much posed by the 
Soviet Union, but by what the Finns did to themselves. Critics, for example, spoke 
of Finnish leaders having made a Faustian deal with the Soviet leadership after the 
war, following which they acted in symbiosis with their foreign masters.75 Finnish 
behaviour was depicted as obsequious, submissive and sycophantic, with internal 
Finlandization a matter of national shame and humiliation – at least for critics. 
In this respect, such critiques resonate with a ‘replacement’ strategy whereby 
desecuritization of one relationship is facilitated through the securitization of 
something else (in this case a prior rendering of the Finnish self ). Restoring national 
pride and ontological security would therefore require reinstituting democratic 
principles of open discussion and vigorous political debate.
This openness to debate was also evident over Karelia. As indicated, during 
the Cold War Finnish leaders, including Finland’s last Cold War president, Mauno 
Koivisto (1982–1994), contributed to keeping Karelia-related discussion on a 
backburner in favour of prioritizing a normalization of relations with the Soviet 
Union/Russia. Central to this strategy was extricating Finland from its previous 
treaty-bound commitments of the post-WWII years and establishing closer links 
with and eventually membership of the European Union.76 In particular, the issue 
73  Majander, Mikko (1999), ‘The Paradoxes of Finlandization’, Northern Dimensions, The Finnish Institute 
of International Aff airs Yearbook, pp.85–94; Penttilä, Risto E. J. (1992), ‘Offi  cial Religions’, Books From 
Finland, no. 1, pp. 41–3; Salminen, Esko (1999), The Silenced Media: The Propaganda War between 
Russia and the West in Northern Europe, Macmillan Press Ltd..
74 Vihavainen, Timo (1998), Before the War: Finland, Stalin and Germany in the 1930’s http://virtual.
fi nland.fi /fi nfo/english/before.html (accessed 02/04/98); Jakobson, Max (1998), Finland in the New 
Europe, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, pp. 27, 41. 
75 Majander, Mikko (1999), op. cit., p. 89. 
76 Kangaspuro, Markku (2012), Salaista kaupankäyntiä Karjalalla [Secret Trading with Karelia], in 
Fingerroos, Outi and Häyrynen, Mauno (eds.), Takaisin Karjalaan, Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjalli-
suuden Seura, p. 67. 
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was seen as closed in view of various peace treaties and Finland’s having signed the 
fi nal document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), i.e. 
a document premised on the inviolability of existing borders in Europe. However, 
the demise of the Cold War and the subsequent fl exibility shown by the Soviet 
Union, in particular in respect of the re-unifi cation of Germany, generated hopes 
among the Finnish public that this fl exibility might also extend to the Karelian 
question. Hence, with underlying fears of the Eastern neighbour diminishing, the 
strategy of silencing no longer worked and a new approach had to be instituted. 
What resulted was an approach that continued to acknowledge the sensitive 
nature of the issue. 
This, for example, was evident in the 1992 statement of Gustav Hägglund, a 
member of the military leadership, that for serious reasons of national defence 
Finland would not wish to have Karelia returned ‘even if it was off ered on a golden 
plate’. In his view – and mirroring concerns expressed during the Cold War – such 
a move could only problematize relations with Finland’s neighbour by seriously 
impacting on Russia’s ability to adequately defend St. Petersburg.77 Aside from 
such assertions, however, it was emphasized that Finland would not itself make a 
move to open the question, but that it would be prepared to discuss the issue if the 
Soviet Union/Russia itself fi rst indicated a preparedness to engage in talks.
However, despite such statements indicating that until such time as Russia 
raised the issue the matter should be seen as closed, in the new spirit of openness 
various offi  cials also actively endorsed open discussion of the issue as a sign of 
a healthy democracy.78 As President Martti Ahtisaari put it in 1998 in respect of 
the question of sovereignty over Karelia: ‘It is part of civilized society that variant 
opinions too may be expressed… [I would be]… the last one to deny the people 
any such discussion’.79 Indicative, here, is that since the end of the Cold War calls 
for restitution have once again been raised within Finnish society. These have 
principally come from organisations, like the Karjalan Liitto (The Finnish Karelian 
League) and ProKarelia, who represent the Karelian refugees and their descendants 
and are in particular concerned with restitution or compensation for their lost 
properties. Such organisations, however, have also discussed the possibility of 
returning Karelia to Finnish sovereign jurisdiction. In this respect, while the previous 
emphasis on silencing discussion of Karelia may have removed it as a direct point 
77 Ainola, Olli (1995), ’Kiusallinen Karjala’ [Aggravating Karelia], Suomen Kuvalehti, no. 49, pp. 16–
21; Ainola, Olli (1998), ’Karjala takaisin?’ [Regaining Karelia?], Helsingin Sanomat, kuukaisiliite. 
September, pp. 54–59.
78 Forsberg, Tuomas (1995), ‘Karelia’, in Tuomas Forsberg (ed.), Contested Territory: Border Disputes at the 
Edge of the Former Soviet Empire, Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, p. 215. 
79 Ainola, Olli (1998), op. cit., p. 58.
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of contention in Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War, it also indicates that 
the suppression of discussion postponed, rather than resolved, the issue.
It should also be noted, however, that while public debate on the issue has been 
endorsed at the highest levels, Finnish governments have continued to indicate 
they have no desire to unilaterally raise the issue with Russia at an offi  cial level, with 
Finland’s post-Cold War presidents and governments consistently arguing that the 
border question is not a meaningful political objective. In part, this refl ects Russia’s 
continued sensitivity towards the issue, and which stems from its own rather close 
relationship between national identity, territory and sovereignty,80 with President 
Putin warning in 2000 that any discussion on borders would threaten to ‘ruin’ the 
countries’ relations.81 In this respect, Karelia is no longer considered so important as 
to risk damaging the Finnish-Russian relationship. This, though, raises the question 
why?
One explanation is that since the end of the Cold War the ontological 
foundations of Finnish nationalism and the grounds on which national self-esteem 
is to be achieved has begun to change. In particular, space has been opened up 
for a reformulation of national self-narratives, the result being that Herderian 
and Hegelian principles, which were previously combined into an emphasis on 
the need to unite the Finnish tribes into a single state, centred on the presumed 
territorial heartland of the nation, have lost infl uence. The decline in standing of 
the territorial principle has arguably been driven through several processes. 
At the general level it has refl ected Finland’s post-Cold War drive to be 
accepted as a full member of the West and the European community of nations 
more specifi cally.82 In the early 1990s, for example, it was realized that reigniting a 
territorial dispute with Russia was only likely to undermine Finland’s chances of EU 
membership.83 Instead, Finland sought to position itself as a responsible member 
of the international community by adhering to the principles of the CSCE that 
80 It also appears that the question of potential concessions in the case of the Finnish-Russian border 
is tied to other border-related issues, above all that between Russia and Japan in respect of the 
Kurile Islands/Northern Territories (cf. Ishiwatari, 1995). On occasion the argument is presented that 
Russia has the right to these areas as compensation for the losses suff ered in WWII. These attitudes 
do, however, present a willingness to consider various ‘soft’ policies adding to the permeability of 
the Finnish-Russian border (cf. Marin 2006; Yarovoy 2010; Prozorov 2004).
81 Goble, Paul (2000), ‘Russia: Analysis From Washington – Borders and Frontiers’, Reuters at http://
www.rferl.org/nca/features/2000/06/F.RU.000612132126.html (accessed 19/06/2000).
82 Browning, Christopher S. (2002), ‘Coming Home or Moving Home? “Westernizing” Narratives in 
Finnish Foreign Policy and the Reinterpretation of Past Identities’, Cooperation and Confl ict, vol. 37, 
no. 1, pp. 47–72.
83 Medvedev, Sergei (1998), Russia as the Subconsciousness of Finland, Helsinki: UPI Working Papers; 
Finnish Institute of International Aff airs, no. 7, p. 17; Forsberg, Tuomas (1995), op. cit., p. 216. 
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precisely encourage states to refrain from making such claims.84 More particularly, 
such restraint should also be seen in the context of the then ongoing fragmentation 
of Yugoslavia.85 Not making claims on Karelia and provoking Russia as such was a 
way of signalling that instead of being mired in the territorial politics of modernity, 
Finland had embraced the new world of supposedly post-national, post-territorial 
politics. Finland was not East European (Balkan), but a level-headed rational West 
European. 
This decline in the salience of the territorial principle, however, has also been 
evident in a more fundamental restructuring within governmental and business 
circles of the perceived ontological foundations of the salient features of the 
international system. In this restructuring, geopolitical mindsets emphasizing 
territorial borders have increasingly been replaced by geoeconomic mindsets 
closer to a Herderian than a Hegelian viewpoint, and primarily concerned with 
how best to make one’s mark in a globalizing world. From this perspective, success 
and national self-esteem are increasingly seen as dependent upon successfully 
integrating into globalized markets and securing a seat at the tables where the 
major decisions are made.86
At the specifi c level of Karelia, such ontological shifts have in part been a 
result of more experiential factors. With the opening of the border thousands of 
Finns took the opportunity to visit Karelia. However, instead of discovering the 
mythical Promised Land, for many the overriding impression was one of economic 
stagnation, backwardness and a land that had been largely russifi ed (e.g. through 
name changes and the removal of historical memorials). The result for many was 
disillusion. Returnees found their former homes occupied by people who had 
established their own lives and traditions on the land, and in many cases had very 
limited knowledge of Karelia’s previous history and proclaimed Finnish roots. 
This is not to say Karelia has altogether lost its evocative role in Finnish national 
identity discourse, but rather that the nature of this role has begun to change. 
Particularly important is the apparent reconciliation with the loss of Karelia and its 
replacement with a truly mythical Karelia that need not be so obviously tied to a 
specifi c territory. Indeed, confronted with the economic and social realities of the 
region it rather seems that the value of Karelia for Finnish national identity has, 
84 Joenniemi, Pertti (1998), ‘The Karelian Question: On the Transformation of a Border Dispute’, 
Cooperation and Confl ict, vol. 33, no. 2, p. 194. 
85 Saarikoski, Vesa (1997), ‘Finland in the Context of the “Europe Between” in the 20th Century’, in Vesa 
Saarikoski (ed.), And Never Shall They Meet? European Space and Thought Between East and West, 
Turku: Department of Political History, University of Turku; Publications 6, p. 91.
86 Browning, Christopher S. and Marko Lehti (2007), ‘Beyond East-West: Marginality and National 
Dignity in Finnish Identity Construction’, Nationalities Papers, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 691–716.
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for many people, shifted from its location as a particular territorial space, precisely 
to its status as a mythical and fantastical construct whose actual location and 
bordering are largely irrelevant.87 
What this points to is a process of desecuritization through ‘fading’. Karelia has 
stopped being a point of confl ict because its signifi cance in the construction of 
Finnish national identity has transformed owing to a more general shift in how the 
needs of ontological security and national self-esteem are to be achieved in post-
Cold War Finland. Two things seem to be important in this respect. 
First, the post-Cold War emphasis on the emergence of a post-territorial 
politics, most evident in the breaking down of borders in the context of European 
integration, has downgraded the importance of questions of (extra)territorial 
sovereignty. In this context, the exteriority of Karelia has even proved something of 
a resource for a nation keen to demonstrate its post-Cold War European credentials. 
In this context, instead of asserting claims of territorial sovereignty the emphasis 
has rather been on transforming the divisive border into a unifying frontier, a 
place of exchange, cooperation and dialogue – a place for exploring a new less 
exclusionary politics. An initial move in this direction was evident in the signing 
of the Nearby Region Agreement in 1992, through which the Finnish and Russian 
governments permitted municipalities on either side of the border to engage in 
cooperative dialogue outside of the states’ direct control.88 Also important has 
been the improvement of cross-border road and rail infrastructures, the creation 
of new border crossing points – now straddling a border that was closed for some 
70 years – and the proliferation of cooperative business ventures.89 In particular, 
the establishment of the Euroregio Karelia in 2000 as a vehicle for cooperation, 
comprising of the Karelian Republic on the Russian side and three diff erent regions 
on the Finnish side, testifi es to the dominance of a new and cooperative territorial 
87 Harle, Vilho and Moisio, Sami (2000), Missä on Suomi? Kansallisen identiteettipolitiikan historia ja 
geopolitiikka [Where is Finland? The History and Geopolitics of National Identity Politics], Tampere: 
Vastapaino, pp. 115–7; Although the debate continues, it is less of a national debate and also far less 
contentious than it used to be. The ammunition generating some debate consists mostly of books 
and other materials produced or sponsored by the various associations engaged in claiming Karelia 
back (cf. Minkkinen 2012; Saksi 2005; Seppinen 1998).
88 Eskelinen, Heikki, Haapanen, Elisa and Druzhinin, Pavel (1999), ‘Where Russia Meets the EU. Across 
the Divide in the Karelian Borderlands’, in Heikki Eskelinen, Ilkka Liikanen and Jukka Oksa (eds.), 
Curtains of Iron and Gold: Reconstructing Borders and Scales of Interaction, Aldershot: Ashgate, p. 333; 
Tikkanen, Ville and Käkönen, Jyrki (1997), ‘The Evolution of Cooperation in the Kuhmo-Kostamuksha 
Region of the Finnish-Russian Border, in Ganster, Paul, Sweedler, Al, Scott, James and Eberwein, 
Wolf-Dieter (eds.), Borders and Border Regions in Europe and North America, San Diego: San Diego 
State University Press, pp. 169–70.
89 Goble, Paul (2000), op. cit. 
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logic.90 The coincidence of national territorial boundaries with state boundaries 
therefore appears to have lost some of its motivating force in the national project. 
Thus, while Karelia remains salient to Finnish culture, the belongingness of Karelia, 
and either/or delineations of political space more generally, have declined in 
importance, thereby allowing the border increasingly to connect rather than 
isolate.91
Second, while Karelia remains important to Finnish national identity, it 
increasingly appears to be less of a holy territory for a nation that in the post-Cold 
War period has actively embraced globalization as the principal challenge of the 
contemporary age. Put diff erently, the myth of Karelia has increasingly been pushed 
aside by new myths of the Finns’ entrepreneurial spirit and technological prowess 
– most notably crystallized in the late 1990s and early 2000s in proclamations 
of a new Finnish model of the ‘information society’, epitomized in the success of 
the IT sector and the occasional repackaging of the country as ‘Nokia Finland’.92 
Self-esteem and ontological security, therefore, are no longer to be grounded in 
the tales of the Kalevala and working towards the consolidation of the national 
space of Greater Finland, but rather through getting to grips with globalization and 
succeeding in global markets.
CONCLUSION
The case of Karelia is, as an instance of confl ict resolution, no doubt both interesting 
as well as relevant. From the Finnish perspective confl ict over Karelia from the end of 
the nineteenth century through to the end of the Second World War was primarily a 
result of how the region was imbued with deep ontological signifi cance. Under the 
infl uence of Herderian and Hegelian conceptions of the nature and requirements 
of nationhood Karelia became not just a part of Finland, but representative of its 
essence and without which Finland could not really be truly Finland or Finnish. In 
the wake of the Bolshevik revolution, the declaration of independence and a civil 
war Finnish identity also became increasingly articulated through the radicalization 
90 Cronberg, Tarja (2003), ‘Euroregio Karelia: In Search for a Relevant Space of Action’, in Hedegaard, 
Lars et al. (eds.), The NEBI Yearbook 2003. North European and Baltic Sea Development, Berlin: Springer, 
pp. 231–39; Scott, James (2013), Construction of Familiarity in Finnish-Russian Karelia: Shifting Uses 
of History and the Re-Interpretation of Regions, European Planning Studies, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 75–92.
91 Joenniemi, Pertti (1998), op. cit., p. 199. 
92 Castells, Manuel and Pekka Himanen (2002), The Information Society and the Welfare State: The 
Finnish Model, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Hakala, Ulla, Arja Lemmetyinen and Juergen 
Gnoth (2010), ‘The Role of Nokia in Branding Finland – Companies as Vectors of Nation Branding’, 
in Frank M. Go and Robert Govers (eds.) International Place Branding Yearbook 2010, Houndmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 55–65.
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of an enemy image of Russia/Soviet Union. In this context, the inter-war period 
became one of high-level securitization in Finnish-Soviet relations with this further 
heightening desires to annex Karelia into the homeland.
In this respect, the argument advanced has been that confl ict resolution in 
respect of Karelia has taken place through a two-stage process of desecuritization. 
After the Second World War desecuritization was driven by dual processes of 
rearticulation and silencing. The tragedy of the war, it was argued in the Finnish 
discourse, was a direct result of the failure to understand the true nature of Russian/
Soviet identity. Given the centrality of the Eastern neighbour to Finland’s own sense 
of self-understanding, any rearticulation of Russian identity explicitly implied a 
renegotiation of what it was to be Finnish and what Finland’s role, international 
identity and interests should be. The imperative that Finland’s survival was seen 
as dependent upon the public accepting this new discourse of the nature of Self 
and Other in turn resulted in active processes of silencing designed to suppress 
dissenting views and which, as the Cold War progressed, became increasingly 
oppressive in nature. In this context, public discussion of the Karelian question was 
viewed as threatening national security. Framed slightly diff erently, attempts to 
put the Finnish-Soviet relationship on a more normal footing and to desecuritize 
the question of Karelia in this context, were, as such, ultimately premised on the 
high level securitization of the Finnish-Soviet relationship within internal Finnish 
politics. In this respect, enforced silencing and the curtailing of democratic 
debate was a clear instance of exceptional measures being justifi ed through the 
invocation of questions of national security. Thus, while seeking to dampen fears of 
the Soviet Union, the strategies of rearticulation and silencing often served only to 
mask them, and at times (though not always) could generate heightened anxieties, 
especially amongst critics.
In the post-Cold War period desecuritization of Karelia has taken diff erent forms. 
Throughout the 1990s, for example, criticism of Cold War (self )-censorship seems 
to have resulted in a strategy of replacement, whereby internal securitization of 
the Finnish-Soviet relationship was replaced with a withering critique of Cold War 
domestic politics and the need to uphold democratic principles of open and free 
discussion. Such criticisms have generated a certain amount of introspection and 
anxiety by raising rather fundamental questions about the morality of Finland’s Cold 
War positioning and what this might say about Finnish identity. More signifi cant, 
however, has been considerable evidence that a process of fading is underway as 
a result of which Karelia has simply lost its security signifi cance in most debates 
about Finnish national identity. 
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Central to this has been the emergence of a diff erent ontological perspective 
whereby the Herderian/Hegelian emphasis on organic national essences and 
territorial sovereignty has been displaced as the central grounds on which claims 
to national identity are made and national self-esteem sought. While Karelia 
remains ontologically signifi cant, this signifi cance has gradually been stripped of 
its territorial imperative, and now essentially resides on the mythical plane. Instead 
of the territorial principle – and securitization on that basis – exercising nationalist 
minds, increasingly ontological security and national self-esteem are understood 
as being gained through successfully playing the new games of Europeanization 
and globalization.
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